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Fu¨r die Negation liegen die
Verha¨ltnisse nicht so einfach.1
Gentzen
Abstract
The focus of this paper are Dummett’s meaning-theoretical arguments against
classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using
Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing
strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each
argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in re-
sponding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic
assumptions of Dummett’s outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular,
I shall grant Dummett his general bias towards verificationism, encapsu-
lated in the slogan ‘meaning is use’. The second general assumption I see
no need to question is Dummett’s particular breed of molecularism. Some
of Dummett’s assumptions will have to be given up, if classical logic is to
be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. A major result of this
paper will be that the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of
inference in the Dummettian framework.2
1‘The situation is not so easy for negation.’ (Gentzen 1936, 511)
2This paper has been with me for a while. Many people have read or heard versions of
it and contributed with their comments. Instead of trying to list them all, which would
undoubtedly lead to unintended omissions, I’d like to single out two philosophers to whom
I am particularly indebted. Bernhard Weiss, to whom everything I know about Dummett
can be traced, and Keith Hossack, my Doktorvater, for his robust philosophical challenges.
This paper would not have been written without their advise and encouragement. I
would also like to thank the referees for Grazer Philosophische Studien, whose constructive
criticism resulted in a substantial improvement of this paper.
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1 Introduction
Dummett’s meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic are divided
into two kinds. One kind comprises arguments based on the nature of know-
ing and understanding a language: here belong the manifestability and the
acquisition arguments. These arguments aim to establish that the nature of
speakers’ understanding of a language does not warrant the assumption that
every sentence is determinately either true or false. It is widely agreed that
they are either unsuccessful3 or too underdeveloped to carry the force they
are intended to carry—the latter point being attested to by Dummett him-
self, who admits that it is far from a settled issue what full manifestability
amounts to.4
The other kind comprises arguments based on how the meanings of the
logical constants are to be determined in the theory of meaning. They are
the focus of the present paper. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline
three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuc-
cessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classicist5.
It is crucial that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not
challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett’s outlook on the theory
of meaning. In particular, I shall grant Dummett his general bias towards
verificationism, encapsulated in the slogan ‘meaning is use’. The second gen-
eral assumption I see no need to question is Dummett’s particular breed of
molecularism. The point of the present paper is to investigate how, accept-
ing these Dummettian assumptions, the classicist can counter Dummett’s
arguments.
Some of Dummett’s assumptions will have to be given up, if classical
logic is to be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. I will argue
that the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference in the
Dummettian framework.
As Dummett’s project is well known, the discussion of his views on the
theory of meaning remains deliberately concise.
2 tertium non datur
2.1 Against tertium non datur
Dummett rejects holism, the view that the meaning of a word is determined
by the whole language in which it occurs, as well as atomism, the view
that the meaning of a word can be determined individually. In received
3Transposing Alexander Miller’s arguments from the semantic realist to the adherent
of classical logic (Miller 2002, 2003).
4Cf. the ‘Preface’ to (Dummett 1991).
5In defiance of the OED, where ‘classicist’ is reserved for persons who study Classics
or followers of Classicism, I shall use this term to refer to adherents of classical logic.
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terminology, the principle of compositionality states that the meaning of a
syntactically complex expression depends on the meanings of its constituent
expressions and the way they are assembled. Dummett argues for a more
substantial principle, which he calls by the same name. ‘The principle of
compositionality is not the mere truism, which even a holist must acknowl-
edge, that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its composition. Its
bite comes from the thesis that the understanding of a word consists in
the ability to understand characteristic members of a particular range of
sentences containing that word.’ (Dummett 1993, 225) The notion of com-
plexity on which a molecular theory of meaning is built cannot be equated
with syntactic complexity, but characterises semantic features of expressions.
There are expressions an understanding of which requires an understanding
of others first. For instance, whereas understanding the terminology of the
theory of the colour sphere presupposes an understanding of colour words,
the converse is not true: a speaker may be proficient in using colour words
like ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘yellow’ and ‘blue’ without understanding the terms ‘pure’,
‘mixed’ and ‘complementary colour’ or what is meant by ‘saturation’, ‘hue’
and ‘brightness’. The latter expressions are semantically more complex than
the former. As Dummett puts it, a relation of dependence of meaning holds
between them. ‘What the principle of compositionality essentially requires
is that the relation of dependence between [sets of] expressions and [sets
of] sentence-forms be asymmetric.’ (Dummett 1993, 223) The qualification
‘sets of’ is needed because there may be collections of expressions that, al-
though they must form surveyable sets, can only be learned simultaneously;
according to Dummett, this is true for simple colour words (ibid.). A theory
of meaning employs the relation of dependence to impose on the expres-
sions of the language ‘a hierarchical structure deviating only slightly from
being a partial ordering’ (ibid.). It thereby exhibits how the language is
learnable step by step. In learning a language, a speaker works his way up
the hierarchy from semantically less complex to semantically more complex
expressions. Mastering a stage in this process is to master everything a
speaker needs to know about the meanings of the expressions constituting
that stage, and it does not alter the speaker’s understanding of the meanings
of expressions constituting stages lower in the hierarchy. This is Dummett’s
molecularism in the theory of meaning. To avoid confusion with received
terminology, I shall avoid using ‘compositionality’ where the semantic notion
of complexity is concerned and instead use ‘molecularity’.
Applying molecularity to proof-theory and combining it with the ver-
ificationism derived from the principle that meaning is use, according to
Dummett a proof should never need to appeal to sentences more complex
than that which is proved. It should be possible to transform any proof into
one which satisfies this requirement. A speaker following a proof should
always be able to work his way up from less complex assumptions to a more
complex conclusion, where of course intermediate steps down through less
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complex sentences are allowed on the way up. Dummett puts forward the
fundamental assumption of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction: ‘if
we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid
argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduc-
tion rules governing its principal operator.’ (Dummett 1993, 254) Leaving
out the technical details, the fundamental assumption ensures that we can
always construct proofs in such a way that the sentences occurring in the
proof can be ordered by the relation of dependence of meaning, as required
by molecularity, in such a way that the conclusion occupies the highest point
in the hierarchy.6
With this material, Dummett can give a compelling argument against
classical logic on meaning-theoretical grounds. I shall follow traditional ter-
minology and call A∨¬A tertium non datur, which deviates from Dummett’s
terminology. A proof of tertium non datur in the system of classical logic
formalised in (Prawitz 1965) proceeds as follows:7
2
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
2
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
1
A
A ∨ ¬A
⊥
1¬A
A ∨ ¬A
⊥
2
A ∨ ¬A
The proof violates molecularity: the less complex A ∨ ¬A is deduced from
the more complex discharged assumption ¬(A ∨ ¬A). No proof of A ∨ ¬A
which would satisfy Dummett’s criteria can be given. For how should such a
proof of A∨¬A proceed? By molecularity and the fundamental assumption,
6According to Dummett, the fundamental assumption applies not only to arguments
which are proofs, but also to the more general case of deductions with undischarged
premises, which, as Dummett acknowledges, meets some formidable difficulties (Dummett
1993, Chapter 12). These difficulties are irrelevant to the arguments to be given here,
as they only require that the fundamental assumption applies to theorems, in which case
it is provable for intuitionist logic and some formulations of classical logic. In another
paper I argue that, quite independently of the present considerations, it is best to restrict
the fundamental assumption in this way (Ku¨rbis 2012). Strictly speaking, we should
also make a distinction between ‘argument’, ‘canonical proof’ and ‘demonstration’, but
this introduces a complexity unnecessary in the present context. Arguments may contain
‘boundary rules’, which are rules allowing the deduction of atomic sentences from other
atomic sentences, as well as arbitrary inferences (Dummett 1993, 254ff). Canonical proofs
and demonstrations are essentially special cases thereof, formalised in a system of natural
deduction satisfying Dummettian criteria.
7I’ll discuss various ways of formalising classical logic in Prawitz’ system in due course
and show what is wrong with them on the Dummettian plan. We can exclude ways of
formalising logics that Dummett excludes, such as multiple conclusion logics.
4
A∨¬A would have to be derived from A or from ¬A. Whichever it is, it must
come from assumptions that are discharged in the process of the argument.
It cannot be A, for this may be an atomic sentence and no atomic sentence
follows from no premises at all.8 It cannot be ¬A either, for, if A is atomic,
neither does ¬A follow from no premises at all.9 Hence it is not possible
to meet Dummett’s criteria on molecular theories of meaning and accept
A ∨ ¬A as a theorem.10
This argument against classical negation is remarkable. The main as-
sumption it is based on is that a theory of meaning should be molecular,
which is a very plausible assumption. It is not an argument that Dummett
gives himself, but, being based purely upon Dummettian considerations, it is
one that he could give, in particular as he thinks that double negation elim-
ination or an equivalent classical negation rule like consequentia mirabilis,
from Γ,¬A ` ⊥ to infer Γ ` A, violate constraints on molecularity. It is an
argument that is very strong indeed.11
2.2 A classicist response
The appeal to molecularity in the argument against tertium non datur as-
sumes that A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A) are of different semantic complexity.
It is a fair question to ask—whether one is a classicist or not—what it is
that a speaker needs to understand in order to understand ¬(A ∨ ¬A) that
she does not need to understand in order to understand A ∨ ¬A. On the
face of it, there is nothing in one that is not in the other. To understand
A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A), one needs to understand ¬, ∨ and that A stands
for a sentence. Dummett introduces two notions of complexity: syntactic
complexity, related to what is normally called the principle of composition-
ality, and semantic complexity, his notion of molecularity. The two notions
do not coincide. For the argument against tertium non datur to go through,
it has to be assumed that the fact that ¬(A ∨ ¬A) contains A ∨ ¬A as a
proper subformula, and is therefore syntactically more complex, carries over
to their respective semantic complexities. I shall argue that this assumption
8If A is not something like verum, but it is clear enough how the point is to be taken.
9If A is not something like falsum, cf. the previous footnote.
10For special areas of enquiry one may be able to show that either A or ¬A, as is the case
in intuitionist arithmetic for atomic A. However, this is not a question of logic: it makes
assumptions concerning the subject matter of the atomic sentences, and logic makes no
such assumptions.
11It rules out even logics in which negation is conservative over the positive fragment,
such as the relevant logic R. According to Belnap, responding to (Prior 1961), conserva-
tiveness is a requirement for the existence of a constant (Belnap 1962, 133f). This is not
sufficient to ensure that the constant is a respectable one on Dummett’s account, as other
meaning-theoretical constraints have to be satisfied, too. Hence someone following Peter
Milne’s suggestion of viewing consequentia mirabilis as an introduction rule for A still
needs to answer Dummett’s molecularity constraint, as Milne himself notes (Milne 1994,
58f). The present paper can be seen as providing Milne with a solution to this problem.
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is unmotivated.
Consider what Dummett says is involved in understanding ‘or’. ‘On a
compositional [i.e. molecular] meaning-theory, to know the meaning of ‘or’,
for example, is to be able to derive, from the meanings of any sentences A
and B, the meaning of pA or Bq [. . .] To understand pA or Bq, therefore,
you must (i) observe the composition of the sentence, (ii) know what ‘or’
means, (iii) know what A and B mean.’ (Dummett 1993, 222) Decomposit-
ing clauses (ii) and (iii) in the cases of A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A) end in the
same final components: in each case you need to know what ∨, ¬ and A
mean.
Arguably, clause (i) does not impart semantic complexity either. I can-
not just observe the composition of a sentence in the abstract, as it were:
understanding the composition is essentially tied to an understanding of the
parts and how they are pieced together. To understand ∨, I need to un-
derstand that it takes two sentences and forms a sentence out of them. I
also need to understand the principles of inference governing it. As there
are two introduction rules for ∨, my understanding guarantees that I under-
stand that the order of the sub-sentences plays a role in the composition,
even though the two options are logically equivalent. As another example,
take ⊃: understanding this connective involves understanding that it forms
a sentence out of two sentences and the rules of inference governing it. The
latter guarantee that my understanding also involves an understanding that
the meaning of the resulting sentence is different depending on which sen-
tence I put to the left and which one to the right of ⊃. How to compose
sentences with these constants is an essential part of understanding them.
It comes together with an understanding of what ∨ or ⊃ mean that they put
together sentences in a certain way, which results in the sentences having a
certain composition.
In addition, the meanings of the logical constants are given in a com-
pletely general way. Concerning the understanding of logical constants,
Dummett writes that ‘the understanding of a logical constant consists in
the ability to understand any sentence of which it is the principal opera-
tor: the understanding of a sentence in which it occurs otherwise than as
the principal operator depends on, but does not go to constitute, an under-
standing of the constant.’ (Dummett 1993, 224) The rules governing it tell
us how to proceed when the constant applies to any sentences whatsoever.
If I understand an operator and can apply it in one case (e.g. ¬A), I can
also be expected to be able to apply it in any other case (e.g. ¬(A ∨ ¬A)),
given I understand the rest of the context, which ex hypothesi is so in the
case of tertium non datur, as ∨ is understood. Of course we need to observe
how the components are pieced together. But in piecing them together in
one way or other, no new conceptual resources are required.
Following this line of reasoning, the classicist can point out that in fact
the proof of tertium non datur does not violate molecularity. The difference
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in the syntactic complexity between A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A) does not carry
over to the semantic level. Exactly the same conceptual resources are needed
to understand either of them.
Thus the classicist has a straightforward response to the Dummettian
argument against tertium non datur. It proceeds entirely on Dummettian
grounds, appealing only to principles that Dummett himself puts forward.
It has the further implication of revealing the fundamental assumption to
be an excessive requirement, if, as Dummett demands, it is applied strictly
to the main operator of a theorem.
The phenomenon that syntactic complexity doesn’t carry over to seman-
tic complexity is more widespread than just the logical constants. Consider
‘Fred paints the wall in complementary colours’. This is syntactically less
complex than ‘Fred paints the wall in red and green, or blue and orange, or
purple and yellow’. However, it is semantically more complex, as I cannot
understand the concept ‘complementary colour’ without understanding sim-
ple colour words. Similarly, Dummett suggests that ‘child’, ‘boy’ and ’girl’
are expressions that occupy the same point in the partial ordering that de-
pendence of meaning imposes on the expressions of the language. They can
only be learnt together, where some logical relations between them need to
be recognised as well (Dummett 1993, 267). If this is so, then, even though
it is syntactically more complex, ‘Hilary is a boy or a girl’ is semantically as
complex as ‘Hilary is a child’.
2.3 Conclusion
Although unsuccessful, the Dummettian argument against tertium non datur
is significant as it is an attempt to formulate an argument against classical
logic purely on the basis of very general considerations about the form a the-
ory of meaning has to take. It relies on the assumption that the difference
in the syntactic complexity between A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A) carries over to
the semantic level. The classicist can respond by denying that this is so.
The classicist response is not based on any specifically classical principles.
In particular, it makes no reference to the fact that classical logic does not
need ∨ as a primitive, which the Dummettian can counter by arguing that
as ordinary language has an undefined ‘or’, logic should have ∨ undefined,
too. The core and motivation of the classicist response can be accepted
by philosophers of any logical bias. The argument against tertium non
datur aims to establish that something is wrong with classical logic, if the
framework of a Dummettian theory of meaning is assumed. The classicist
response does not proceed by establishing that something is wrong with
Dummett’s favourite, intuitionist logic, but only that the argument fails to
show that something is wrong with classical logic: we have not been given
good reasons to believe that classical logic does not fit into the Dummettian
framework.
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Philosophy being what it is, straightforward arguments and simple re-
sponses won’t settle the issue. In the next section, I shall give a second
Dummettian argument against classical negation that aims to establish that
negation in general does add to the semantic complexity of sentences, and I
shall provide a corresponding classicist response.
3 Classical negation rules
3.1 Against rules yielding classical negation
The Dummettian argument against tertium non datur focussed on a spe-
cific application of classical negation rules. The classicist response counters
that this application cannot be objectionable on Dummettian grounds. The
Dummettian should now focus more generally on the effect of rules that,
when added to intuitionist logic, yield classical logic.
To illustrate the line of argument, assume classical logic is formalised by
adding double negation elimination to intuitionist logic with the following
rules for negation introduction and elimination and ex falso quodlibet :
i
A
Ξ
⊥
i¬A
¬A A
⊥
⊥
B
I’ll discuss other ways of extending intuitionist to classical logic in due
course.
To establish that these rules violate general constraints imposed on the
theory of meaning, the Dummettian needs to point out that there are sen-
tences B not containing negation which can be established as true only by
using double negation elimination, such as Pierce’s Law ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ A) ⊃ A.
Then the inference of B from ¬¬B would, on Dummettian principles, be
constitutive of the meaning of B, because it licenses uses of B that are not
possible independently of this move. Hence the meaning of B would depend
on the meaning of ¬¬B. But there is a component in ¬¬B the meaning
of which has to be acquired independently of B, i.e. negation. To acquire
an understanding of the meaning of negation, a speaker needs to acquire
an understanding of the rules of inference for negation, which he doesn’t
have to know in order to know B. This is a case where syntactic and se-
mantic complexity go hand in hand. For the Dummettian, ¬¬B counts not
only as syntactically more complex than B, but also as more complex in
the semantic sense. Thus by molecularity, the meaning of ¬¬B is depen-
dent on the meaning of B and negation. This is a circular dependence of
meaning: a speaker who wishes to command an understanding of B would
first have to command an understanding of ¬¬B, which, however, cannot
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be achieved independently of mastery of the meaning of B. A speaker could
not break into the circle and learn the meaning of B. B could have no place
in the partial ordering that the relation of dependence of meaning imposes
on the language. Hence B cannot have a stable meaning at all. It follows
that double negation elimination should be rejected, as it is incompatible
with Dummett’s molecularism and his interpretation of the principle that
meaning is use.12
In deriving a problematic sentence A of the kind we are interested in,
double negation elimination need not be applied in the final step, so that the
whole sentence to be derived is its conclusion. It may instead be applied to
deduce a proper subsentence B of A. There will then still be a sentence that,
in the process of the deduction, can only be derived by deriving its double
negation first. What affects the part affects the whole: A cannot have a
stable meaning if its subsentence B does not have one. Moreover, such a
proof of A can always be transformed into one in which double negation
elimination is the final step, and, for reasons to be explained later in this
section, they both have to count equally as canonical verifications, and the
problem that affects the one affects the other.
It is clear that what applies to double negation elimination equally ap-
plies to other rules for classical negation. The observation at the basis of the
argument against double negation elimination—that there are sentences B
not containing negation that can only be verified by applying double nega-
tion elimination—generalises. As classical negation is not conservative over
the positive fragment of intuitionist logic, any rules for classical negation
will enable us to derive sentences not containing negation using sentences
containing negation. The Dummettian observes that, if classical negation
rules are employed, there are sentences A not containing negation that can
only be verified by a process that at some point appeals to the negation
¬B of a subsentence B of A (not necessarily a proper subsentence). To
understand ¬B a speaker needs to understand something he does not need
12It is worth reflecting whether there are examples of non-logical sentences not contain-
ing negation that can only be verified by double negation elimination, if classical logic is
used, i.e. whether the non-conservativeness of classical negation over the positive fragment
of intuitionist logic applies also to non-logical sentences. Maybe the following is an exam-
ple. Consider an embryo. Let’s call it Hilary. An intuitionist would resist the temptation
of asserting that Hilary is either a boy or a girl, as neither disjunct can yet be verified.
But consider ‘Hilary is neither a boy nor a girl’. Intuitionistically, this is equivalent to
‘Hilary is not a boy and not a girl’. But an intuitionist might accept that if a child is not
a boy, then it is a girl: arguably, verifying that a child is not a boy just is or must proceed
via verifying that it is a girl. Hence if Hilary is neither a boy nor a girl, Hilary is a girl
and not a girl, which is impossible. Hence, the intuitionist can conclude that it is not the
case that Hilary is neither a boy or a girl. The classicist would proceed to apply double
negation elimination to conclude that Hilary is either a boy or a girl, even though there
is no direct verification of the sentence. If this is plausible, then ‘Hilary is either a boy or
a girl’ is an example of a sentence which, if classical logic is used, can only be verified by
verifying its double negation first.
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to understand in order to understand B: negation. Classical negation rules
affect the use of B, as they affect the conditions under which it is assertible,
and thus its meaning. This, once more, produces a circular dependence of
meaning, just as in the case of double negation elimination.
There are other ways of extending intuitionist logic to classical logic than
adding double negation elimination. We could add rules for implication, such
as Pierce’s Rule:
i
A ⊃ B
Π
A
i
A
This rule violates molecularity. If A can only be verified by appeal to this
rule, then the application of the rule would be constitutive of its meaning.
But A ⊃ B occurs in an undischarged assumption, so a speaker applying
the rule needs to understand that sentence in order to be able to do so.
However, the meaning of A ⊃ B depends on the meaning of A. Again, there
is a circular dependence of meaning between A and A ⊃ B.
If negation is defined in terms of ⊥ and ⊃, Peirce’s Rule generalises a
classical negation rule:
i¬A
Π
A
i
A
Even keeping ¬ primitive, the special case is no improvement on the general
case: if A can only be verified by appeal to that rule, then the meaning of
A is dependent on the meaning of ¬A, which appears in an undischarged
premise, and conversely, ¬A is dependent on the meaning of A. Again there
is a circular dependence of meaning. The same counts for consequentia
mirabilis:
i¬A
Π
⊥
i
A
Another strategy is to add dilemma:
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i
A
Π
B
i¬A
Σ
B
i
B
Here the situation is slightly more complicated, but essentially the same.
Any deduction that ends with an application of dilemma can be transformed
into one that appeals to ¬B:
2
B
2¬B
1
A
Π
B
⊥
1¬A
Σ
B
2
B
The case we are interested in is where the final application of dilemma was
part of a canonical verification of B. The transformed deduction contains a
formula, ¬B, that the original one did not contain, and it contains additional
applications of negation introduction and elimination. However, both deduc-
tions employ exactly the same conceptual resources. To follow the original
proof, the speaker needs to understand negation. So he understands ¬B, as
the understanding of negation, being a logical constant, is general. For the
same reason, the additional applications of rules for negation only draw on
resources the speaker who can follow the original deduction already needs
to command. The transformed deduction may contain a maximal formula,
if ¬A is the major premise of negation elimination in Σ. It can be removed:
the conclusion of the rule will be ⊥, and we can move the deduction leading
to the minor premise on top of A in Π. If there is no such deduction, the
case is trivial. The resulting deduction is still a deduction of B via ¬B.
Thus there is no reason not to count the transformed deduction also as a
canonical verification of B. Dummett does not require that every sentence
has at most one canonical verification. Quite to the contrary. Understand-
ing a sentence involves a grasp of the wealth of conditions under which it
counts as conclusively verified. Each derivation must count as equally con-
stitutive of the meaning of B, and once more we have a circular dependence
of meaning, where B depends on ¬B, but ¬B depends on B.
We can generalise dilemma with the following rule:13
13We get dilemma by replacing A with > and C with ⊥. Deleting A ⊃ gives yet another
rule that yields classical negation. It is unacceptable to the Dummettian for similar reasons
as the general version.
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i
A ⊃ B
Π
D
i
B ⊃ C
Σ
D
i
D
A deduction that ends in an application of this rule can be transformed into
one in which D is a subformula of a discharged assumption:
2> ⊃ D >
D
2
D ⊃ C
1
B
A ⊃ B
Π
D
C
1
B ⊃ C
Σ
D
2
D
Instead of >, we could use an arbitrary, but suitably chosen tautology, say
D ⊃ D. We could, indeed, also replace > with other suitably chosen sen-
tences, in particular sentences E such that the meanings of sentences oc-
curring in the original deduction depend on the meaning of E in the partial
ordering that dependence of meaning imposes on the sentences of a lan-
guage in a molecular theory of meaning. As in the case of dilemma, the
transformed deduction uses exactly the same conceptual resources as the
original deduction. Maximal formulas arising from the transformation can
be removed. If the former was a canonical deduction of D, so is the latter.
We get a circular dependence of meaning: D depends on C ⊃ D, which in
turn depends on D, violating molecularity.
Adding corresponding axioms instead of rules cannot make a difference
to the situation, as they are equivalent. Besides, axioms, according to Dum-
mett, count as introduction rules. They introduce grounds for asserting
sentences that are not matched by the consequences of asserting them, as
laid down by the elimination rules for the main connective of the axiom.
Axioms, then, immediately violate Dummett’s verificationism.
In this section, I have only discussed specific cases of rules. It would be
desirable to establish a general result to the effect that any rules that yield
classical logic, when added to intuitionist logic, violate molecularity. The
cases discussed are, however, the most prominent ones and are sufficiently
varied to shift the burden of proof. Once more, we can describe Dummett as
formulating a challenge: find rules that yield classical negation that won’t
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violate general constraints on the theory of meaning. For the present pur-
poses, we can leave matters here. I shall go on to discuss a classicist response
to the concerns of the present section that will exonerate the classicist from
answering this renewed challenge.
To finish, here is a conjecture for a formal result that I leave for another
occasion: A deduction Π ending with an application of a rule that yields
classical logic can be transformed into a deduction Π′ of the same conclu-
sion with the following properties: a) Π′ finishes with an application of the
same rule as Π; b) the conclusion of Π′ occurs as a proper subformula of a
discharged premise; c) only rules applied in Π are applied in Π′; d) formulas
in Π′ not occurring in Π are composed of subformulas of formulas occuring
in Π. The idea is the following. For introduction and elimination rule to
be in harmony, they need to fulfil certain constraints. The resulting logic
is intuitionist. To extend it to classical logic, rules need to be added that
discharge assumptions containing logical constants, an option Dummett ex-
cludes (Dummett 1993, 297). Given further constraints on such rules, a
general procedure can be specified that transforms deductions in the desired
way. Thus any such rule violates molecularity.
3.2 Another classicist response
To counter the argument against rules yielding classical logic, it suffices to
argue that classical negation rules do not, in fact, violate molecularity. What
is needed is a further assumption, one that is very plausible from the classical
perspective, but not inherently classicist: although ¬A is syntactically more
complex than A, this does not carry over to the crucial semantic notion of
complexity at the foundation of Dummett’s molecularism.
Peter Geach has proposed a view on negation which has the desired
consequences. Geach holds that an understanding of negation and an un-
derstanding of affirmation14 cannot be separated from each other. A speaker
cannot understand Fa without understanding ¬Fa and conversely: ‘they go
inseparately together—eadem est scientia oppositorum.’ (Geach 1972, 79)
Following Geach, I shall use ‘predicate’ to mean not a predicate letter, but
a meaningful expression of a language, or alternatively ‘concept’. Someone
understanding a predicate needs to be able to distinguish between things
to which it applies and things to which it does not apply. Understanding a
predicate enables a speaker to draw this distinction. Thus understanding a
predicate endows a speaker with a grasp of affirmation as well as negation.
Consequently, ‘the understanding of “not male” is no more complex than
that of “male”.’ (ibid.) To grasp a concept is inseparable from grasping its
negation, as ‘knowing what is red and what is not are inseparable.’ (Geach
1971, 25) A speaker cannot acquire a grasp of one without acquiring a grasp
14Affirmation is not to be confused with assertion, which is a speech act. Historically,
‘position’ has also been used to denote the opposite of negation.
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of the other: they are learnt together. Hence, according to Geach, a sentence
and its negation are of the same semantic complexity.15
Geach’s view on affirmation and negation is comparable to Dummett’s
view on simple colour words. According to Dummett, in order to under-
stand the meaning of ‘red’, e.g., I also need to understand other simple
colour words, like ‘brown’, ‘green’ and ‘yellow’. Geach makes the analogous
point about a predicate and its negation: to understand ‘red’ requires un-
derstanding of ‘not-red’ and vice versa. Combining Dummett’s and Geach’s
points, to understand what it means that something is red or green or blue
etc., I also need to understand that what is green is not red etc. Saying
what something is, is also saying what it is not, or as Spinoza says: omnis
determinatio est negatio.
It is worth noting at this point that saying that Fa and ¬Fa go insepa-
rately together is one thing, rejecting the claim that ¬Fa exhibits a compos-
ite structure quite another. Geach should not be understood as claiming the
latter. Even if negation is as fundamental to understanding as affirmation,
it makes a uniform contribution to sentences in which it occurs, and ¬Fa
may still be described as being composed of ¬ and Fa. Geach’s point is only
that in this case syntactic composition does not add to semantic complexity.
If the classicist adopts Geach’s account of negation, there is an answer
to the molecularity challenge posed by the argument against rules yield-
ing classical negation. If negation and affirmation go inseparately together,
then diagnosing a difference in the complexities of A and ¬A relies on a mis-
conception: it is wrong to measure their semantic complexity by observing
that one contains a sentential operator in principal position that the other
lacks. As a speaker acquires an understanding of both simultaneously, the
same conceptual resources are required in understanding A and understand-
ing ¬A. Transposing Geach’s ideas to the Dummettian molecular theory of
meaning, A and ¬A occupy the same position in the partial ordering that
dependence of meaning imposes on a language. Thus they have the same
semantic complexity. If the sense of an expression is something a speaker
has to know about the expression in order to be able to use it, then a theory
of meaning along Geach’s lines would specify simultaneously the senses of
A and its negation ¬A. Correspondingly, establishing ¬A as true is an op-
15Although Geach puts his point in terms of predicate negation, it carries over to sen-
tential negation and was certainly intended to do so. This is particularly clear in the
present context, as Dummett and, according to his interpretation, Frege would call ¬Fξ
the negation of the predicate Fξ only in a derivative way. Strictly speaking, there is no
predicate negation, according to Frege/Dummett. Negation is a function, and functions
always have objects as values, whereas predicate negation would take functions as values
(Dummett 1981, 40ff). ¬Fξ is not constructed from Fξ by applying negation, but in the
same way as every predicate: from a sentence by omitting some occurrences of a name:
from the sentence Fa we omit the name a to get the predicate Fξ, we apply negation to
the sentence Fa to get ¬Fa and drop a from it to get the predicate ¬Fξ. In the final
analysis, any talk of predicate negation is explicable in terms of sentential negation.
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eration of the same complexity as establishing A as true. Consequently, the
argument against classical negation rules loses its force: a verification of B
that proceeds via ¬B does not result in a circular dependence of meaning,
and hence unintelligibility, even if B does not contain negation and cannot
be verified otherwise.
This completes the classicist response to the Dummettian argument
against rules yielding classical negation. There are, however, no obvious
reasons why Geach’s view on negation should be restricted to the classicist.
It is quite neutral. An intuitionist might accept it, too. The point that a
sentence and its negation are of equal semantic complexity can be motivated
independently of which rules negation is subject to. Initially at least, Geach
makes no reference to classical logic.16
3.3 Conclusion
The argument against classical negation rested on the observation that, if
classical logic is used, there are sentences not containing negation that can
be verified only by a process that appeals to rules yielding classical nega-
tion, and that this leads to a violation of molecularity, due to the nature of
those rules. The classicist response rested on the assumption that a sentence
and its negation are of equal semantic complexity. This may be controver-
sial. But as with the classicist response to the argument against tertium
non datur, although this assumption is particularly attractive for classicists
like Geach, it is not one that actually depends on any specifically classicist
assumptions. An intuitionist could adopt it, too.
The next Dummettian argument I shall consider aims at establishing
that the negation of a sentence must be semantically more complex than
the sentence itself. It differs from the argument against tertium non datur
and rules yielding classical negation in that it not only attempts to show
that something is wrong with classical logic, but also that intuitionist logic
is the right logic.
16This is not affected by Geach’s illustration of his view, an obvious reference to Frege’s
metaphor of concepts with sharp boundaries (Frege 1998, Vol. II: §56): ‘A predicate may
be represented by a closed line on a surface, and predicating it of an object be represented
by placing the point representing the object on one or other side of this line. A predicate
and its negation will then clearly be represented by one and the same line; and there
can be no question of logical priority as between the inside and the outside of the line,
which inseparately coexist.’ (Geach 1972, 79) According to this picture, ¬¬A has the
same content as A. This view is not needed to counter the molecularity challenge. Geach
notices that the picture is problematic for vague predicates. It is only an illustration and
not essential to Geach’s philosophical point.
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4 ex falso quodlibet
4.1 Negation according to Dummett and Prawitz
The two Dummettian arguments against classical logic given so far fail to es-
tablish the desired conclusion that something is wrong with classical logic.
Dummett needs a more forceful argument using more resources than just
general constraints on the theory of meaning. The argument I shall turn
to now is based on a very substantial additional theory, the proof-theoretic
justification of deduction. Its core tenet is that the meanings of the logical
constants, and thus negation, are to be defined by rules of inference govern-
ing them. It is an argument which not only is intended to point towards a
deficiency in classical logic but also aims to establish that intuitionist logic
is the correct logic.
Dummett argues that the meanings of logical constants should be given
by self-justifying rules of inference governing them. To exclude connectives
like Prior’s tonk, these rules are required to be in harmony. For the present
purposes, I do not need to go into the details of Dummett’s account and can
remain fairly informal about this notion.17 Dummett demands that there
be harmony between the canonical grounds of an assertion of a sentence
with a main connective ∗ and the consequences of accepting it as true.
Molecularity plays a role in motivating harmony: learning the meaning of
logical connectives does not affect the meanings of expressions you have
already learnt (nor, indeed, does what you have already learnt affect their
meanings). Dummett claims that if the procedure of the proof-theoretic
justification of deduction is followed, the meanings of the logical constants
are given independently of a notion of truth that prejudges issues between
classicists and intuitionists. The logic which turns out to be the justified
one is the correct logic.18
Dummett argues that the negation operator should be defined in terms
of implication and falsum, ¬A =def. A ⊃ ⊥, as considerations of rules for
an undefined negation operator show. There are two common options for
the introduction rule. The first option is that ¬A follows if A entails a
contradiction:
i
A
Π
B
i
A
Ξ
¬B
i¬A
17I give formally precise definitions of harmony and stability in (Ku¨rbis 2013), which
work by specifying how to read off introduction from elimination rules and conversely.
18For details, cf. (Dummett 1993, chapters 11-13).
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It can hardly be claimed that the meaning of negation is defined by this
rule: negation is already used in the premises.19 Dummett himself employs
a rule which suffers from the same inadequacy (Dummett 1993, 291ff):
i
A
Ξ
¬A
i¬A
A more promising option is to employ the introduction rule that ¬A may
be derived if A entails falsum:
i
A
Ξ
⊥
i¬A
⊥ is governed by ex falso quodlibet, where B may be restricted to atomic
formulas:
⊥
B
Negation introduction is harmonious with the rule ex contradictione falsum,
needed for a complete account of negation:
A ¬A
⊥
An attempt at defining the meaning of negation in terms of the last three
rules is unacceptable. The rules define the meaning of negation in terms
of falsum, and the meaning of falsum in terms of negation: the rule for
negation elimination is also a rule for falsum introduction, and the rule for
negation introduction is also a rule for falsum elimination. Using these three
rules leads to a circular dependence between the meanings of negation and
falsum. Dummett argues that there should be no such circular dependence
between the meanings of the logical constants (Dummett 1993, 257). Hence
this is not a viable option for defining the meaning of negation by rules of
inference in the Dummettian framework.
We are left with Dummett’s option of defining ¬A as A ⊃ ⊥, where ⊥
is governed solely by ex falso quodlibet and ⊃ by its usual introduction and
elimination rules. Different arguments can be given why ex falso quodlibet
19Nonetheless, together with ex contradictione quodlibet as the elimination rule for nega-
tion, a system can be formulated in which deductions normalise.
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satisfies the criterion of harmony. Prawitz argues that it is harmonious with
the empty introduction rule (Prawitz 1979, 35). Dummett likens falsum
to a universal quantifier over atomic formulas (Dummett 1993, 295). The
details need not concern us here. What is important is that the negation
so defined is intuitionist, not classical. Thus intuitionist logic is the correct
logic according to Dummett’s proof-theoretic justification of deduction.
Following this line of argument, classical negation can be excluded, as it
requires the rule consequentia mirabilis:
i¬A
Ξ
⊥
i
A
As already discussed, this rule cannot be used to define the meaning of
negation in terms of falsum, as it cannot count as defining the meaning of
falsum independently of negation. It presupposes negation, which may occur
in discharged premises. Consequentia mirabilis could only count as defining
the meaning of falsum in terms of negation. But Dummett argues that
the meaning of negation has to be defined in terms of falsum. Hence, once
more, employing consequentia mirabilis produces a circular dependence of
the meanings of falsum and negation. Dummett concludes that intuitionist
negation does and classical negation does not satisfy the criteria of the proof-
theoretic justification of deduction.20
It follows that the negation of a sentence is always semantically more
complex than the sentence itself. A ⊃ ⊥ is in general semantically more
complex than A on anyone’s account, as at least for some atomic proposi-
tions, a speaker can understand A without understanding ⊃. Hence Dum-
mett is in a position to claim that Geach’s view that a sentences and its
negation are of equal semantic complexity must be rejected in favour of a
view on which A is less complex than ¬A.
4.2 The classical plan of attack
The rules governing classical negation do not fit the restrictions that Dum-
mett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction imposes on
the form of self-justifying rules of inference. The classicist may, however,
question whether this gives good reasons for rejecting classical logic. Dum-
mett’s and Prawitz’ argument relies on the assumption that the meaning of
negation can be defined by rules of inference. In the next section, I shall
argue that this assumption is incorrect. Ex falso quodlibet fails to confer its
20The discussion of the previous section contains the material necessary to exclude other
ways of extending intuitionist logic to classical logic in a similar way.
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intended meaning on ⊥. Hence the meaning of intuitionist negation cannot
be defined by rules of inference either. But then nothing can be amiss if the
same is true for classical negation and its rules.
If rules of inference are not understood as completely determining the
meaning of the constant they govern, then there is no rationale for requiring
that they satisfy the demands of the proof-theoretic justification of deduc-
tion. For instance, as rules of inference alone are not sufficient to define the
meanings of the connectives F and P with intended interpretation ‘It will
be the case that’ and ‘It has been the case that’, tense logic is not subject
to the proof-theoretic justification of deduction. The fact that the rules and
axioms for P and F do not satisfy its requirements in no way shows that
there is something wrong with them. The rules governing a connective are
subject to the restrictions that the proof-theoretic justification of deduction
imposes on the form of rules of inference if and only if the meaning of the
connective is to be defined purely by the rules of inference governing it.
Thus the fact that classical negation rules do not satisfy the criteria of the
proof-theoretic justification of deduction is insignificant when it comes to
reasons for rejecting classical logic.
4.2.1 The meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of in-
ference
Consider what ⊥ is intended to be: a sentence that is false under any cir-
cumstances. Reading off its meaning from the rules governing it, the result
should be that we cannot but say that ⊥ is false. Although this characteri-
sation of ⊥ appeals to semantics, it does not violate the intended semantic
neutrality of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction. It is legitimate
to appeal to our semantic knowledge in order to see whether we have recon-
structed it correctly in a given meaning-theory. Looking from the outside,
as it were, at someone using ⊥ according to the rule ex falso quodlibet, are
we bound to say that he cannot mean anything but a false sentence with it?
The requirement that no semantic assumptions enter the theory is fulfilled
in this case, as no such assumptions enter the rule ex falso quodlibet. The
question is: does it do the job it is supposed to do?
I think not. The intuitive content of ex falso quodlibet may be explained
as follows: it says about ⊥ something like ‘If you say this, you might as
well say anything’. ⊥ is intended to be the ultimate unacceptable sentence,
because everything follows from it. But what is it that makes a sentence
from which everything follows unacceptable? It is that we assume that
there are some sentences which are false.21 If ‘anything’ covered only true
21Some philosophers might prefer the view that what is unacceptable about a sentence
from which everything follows is that there is no such thing. As they won’t accept Dum-
mett’s and Prawitz’ views on how negation should be defined, we may exclude them from
consideration.
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sentences, there is nothing absurd in a sentence that entails that you may
as well say anything. But it is a contingent feature of language that some
sentences are false. Nothing prevents the atomic sentences of the language
of intuitionist logic from all being true, and in that case every sentence,
atomic and complex, would be true. Under these conditions, ⊥ could be
true. So ex falso quodlibet does not give the intended meaning to ⊥, as it
is not the case that we cannot but say that it is false.22 More precisely, if
every atomic sentence of the language was true, then far from ⊥ having to
be false, it might be true. If all we know about ⊥ is what ex falso quodlibet
tells us, then for all we know ⊥ might be equivalent to the conjunction of all
atomic sentences, and if they are all true, ⊥ would be true.23 So there are
circumstances under which ⊥ may be true, namely if all atomic sentences
are true. So we are under no necessity to say that ⊥ is always false.24
Ironically, the reason why the definition of the meaning of falsum via ex
falso quodlibet is appealing is that implicitly it appeals to different models
for the language. This smuggles in semantic assumptions. It assumes that
⊥ is interpreted as having the same truth-value under every interpretation.
This is not something that could be got from the rule. It is an assumption
about how the semantics of ⊥ is to be given, which is external to the rule
and thus illegitimate in the present context: it would not be the rule alone
that determines the meaning of ⊥.
Dummett faces a predicament. He argues that from the proof-theoretic
perspective, the meaning of negation needs to be given in terms of ⊥. But for
ex falso quodlibet to confer on ⊥ the meaning of a constantly false sentence,
the ‘anything’ it stands for would need to cover some formulas containing
negation, it being understood that A and ¬A are never true together. So
22In section 4.3.2 I argue that the lack of an introduction rule for ⊥ does not remedy
this.
23Dummett acknowledges the possibility of all atomic sentences of a language being
true (Dummett 1993, 295). He also appears to countenance that complex sentences not
containing negation can be logically true (Dummett 1993, 266ff). This suggests that
maybe he envisages a solution along the lines of section 4.3.1 below, which, however, I
shall show not to be workable.
24This argument occurred to me several years ago. I had to discover that other people
found it as well, in particular (Hand 1999). Milne makes the related point that any
deduction of a negated sentence relies on negated premises or discharged hypotheses. He
concludes that ‘it is quite impossible for ¬-introduction to determine the meaning of ¬’
(Milne 1994, 61). The argument has its full force, however, only if it is placed in the larger
context in which it is produced here, because of the multi-layered nature of Dummett’s
argument against classical logic: even if the meaning of negation cannot be defined proof-
theoretically, some response is needed to the molecularity challenge. Incidentally, an
analogous argument purporting to show that the intended meaning of > cannot be given
by rules of inference has a rather less clear status. > has only an introduction rule, but no
elimination rule, which specifies that it follows from every sentence. In a language which
contains just > and atomic sentences, where all atomic sentences are false, > could be
false. But any language can be extended to contain logical constants defined by rules of
inference, in particular ⊃. Then there will always be true sentences in a language.
20
the meaning of ⊥ can only be given with reference to negation. This is
circular.25
The classicist and the intuitionist are consequently in exactly the same
situation with respect to their attempts at defining the meaning of negation
proof-theoretically. Dummett claims that the use of consequentia mirabilis,
the rule specifying the use of both falsum and negation in classical logic,
engenders a circular dependence of meaning between negation and falsum,
and it now has been established that the same can be said about intuitionist
negation.26
I conclude that the meaning of negation cannot be defined purely proof-
theoretically by rules of inference in the Dummettian framework. Conse-
quently, if Dummett’s proposal is that the meaning of a logical constant can
be defined purely in terms of its use in deductive arguments if and only if
this use can be characterised by harmonious introduction and elimination
rules, then he is wrong. Even though in intuitionist logic falsum is governed
by harmonious rules, its meaning cannot be defined by these rules. Only the
only if part holds. There are logical constants the meaning of which cannot
be determined by the harmonious rules governing them.27
4.2.2 Consequences for the theory of meaning
The ingenious idea of Dummett’s proof-theoretic justification of deduction
can be characterised as follows. On the basis of the assumption that speak-
ers can follow rules of inference and a concept of truth, which is neutral in
the sense that none of its logical properties are specified prior to an inves-
tigation into which logic is the correct one, the proof-theoretic justification
of deduction defines the meanings of the logical constants, amongst them
negation. The resulting rules for negation then settle the question which
properties truth has. As these rules are intuitionist, the principle of biva-
lence is not fulfilled. Only positive notions are appealed to as the primitive
notions of the theory of meaning, viz. truth, assertion, affirmation, but not
25A designated absurdity like 0 = 1 instead of ⊥ makes no difference. It is hard to
see how ex absurdo quodlibet might then be justified, if not because one already accepts
ex contradictione quodlibet and uses 0 = 1 as inducing a contradiction, which is again
circular. This works at best in special contexts like arithmetic where 0 = 1 does the job
it is supposed to do due to the axioms of arithmetic, hence not purely due to rules of
inference governing it. In section 4.3.1, I argue that a more mundane absurdity like ‘a is
red and green all over’ does not do the trick either.
26In R there is even less of a chance of defining the meaning of negation in terms of
rules of inference: the relevant falsum constant f is not governed by any rules which are
not also negation rules. At the very outset it must be assumed that we either understand
relevant falsum or negation.
27According to Gentzen, ex falso quodlibet has a Sonderstellung amongst the rules of
inference: ‘it does not belong to one of the logical symbols, but to the propositional symbol
[⊥]’ (Gentzen 1934, 189). Adopting this view cannot help Dummett and Prawitz, as the
question remains where our understanding of ⊥ comes from.
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negative ones, like falsity, denial and negation. Assuming both notions of
truth and falsity as basic would prejudge issues between classicists and intu-
itionists, because each will assume these notions to stand in their favourite
logical relations to each other. The classicist will assume notions of truth
and falsity that satisfy the principle of bivalence, whereas the intuitionist
will assume notions which don’t. The proof-theoretic justification of deduc-
tion was designed to settle the debate between classicists and intuitionists
on neutral grounds. The choice of primitives, truth and rules of inference,
rather than truth and falsity, was supposed to ensure this neutrality.28
The definition of the meaning of negation in terms of rules of inference
fails. The attempt turns out to be circular. In proof-theory, just as we
assume that the meanings of the atomic sentences of the language are given,
we need to assume that the meanings of their negations are given, too. The
main insight to be drawn from the present discussion is that positive as
well as negative primitive notions are needed in the theory of meaning. The
argument of the last section once more suggests Geach’s view on negation,
so that speakers’ understanding of the meaning of negation is an additional
primitive of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction.
If the meaning of negation cannot be given purely by rules of inference, its
rules are of a different nature from the rules of those connectives where this
is possible. In the latter case, we can give the rules governing a constant
from scratch, so to speak: a speaker can be taught the concept by being
taught the rules. Just as we must assume prior understanding of ‘It will be
the case that’ and ‘It used to be the case that’ in formalising tense logic, as
learning the rules and axioms of tense logic are not sufficient to impart this
understanding on a speaker, we must assume that we possess the concept of
negation prior to formalisation. Laying down rules of inference for negation
builds on this understanding. Although the rules tell us something about the
intended interpretation of the symbol, they cannot impart understanding of
the concept formalised.29
28The point can also be made by noting that, if truth and falsity are chosen as primitives,
intuitionists and classicists need to say something about the relation between the two
notions, e.g. that nothing can be both true and false. This relies on using negation
in the metalanguage, as in ‘If A is true, A is not false’. Arguably, the negation of the
object language will then mirror the properties of negation in the metalanguage, and hence,
because classicists and intuitionists will each use their favourite logic in the metalanguage,
neither has given a neutral justification of logical laws.
29Milne may have something similar in mind, when he says that its rules ‘characterise’
negation (Milne 1994, 85). Restricted to negation, it is in line with the views of Arthur
Prior, who argued that inferential relations and truth-tables are devices of ‘putting people
on the track of the meaning of a word’ and ‘can help us in this way to fix the meaning of
a word’: they are a piece of ‘informal pedagogy’ (Prior 1964, 160 & 164).
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4.3 Three counter-arguments refuted
A Dummettian who’d rather not assume an understanding of the meaning
of negation as a primitive might attempt to modify the proof-theoretic jus-
tification of deduction as a response to the argument that the meaning of
negation cannot be defined by rules of inference. In the following, I shall
discuss three accounts that attempt to do so. I shall show that each of them,
though possibly interesting in their own rights, fails to satisfy Dummettian
strictures imposed on the proof-theoretic justification of deduction.
4.3.1 The nature of atomic sentences
One retort is to claim that Dummett’s atomic sentences cannot be atomic
in the sense of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Wittgenstein 2003, 6.3751) and of
formal logic, where they are independent of each other and no conjunction
of atomic formulas is always false and no disjunction of them is always true.
If ⊥ is to do its job, amongst Dummett’s atomic sentences there must be
some that exclude each other and cannot be true together. Surely this is
supported by ordinary language, where there are such mutually exclusive
atomic sentences, say ‘a is red’ and ‘a is green’. Then falsum could not but
be false, as it entails mutually exclusive atomic sentences.30
At a first glance, this looks like a natural way out. However, it defeats
its purpose. To adopt this approach is in fact to admit that the proof-
theoretic definition of the meanings of the logical constants fails in the case
of negation, as it is obviously not a purely proof-theoretic definition. Proof-
theory is not concerned with what the atomic sentences of a language are
like; any collection will do. That the amendment is spurious is also seen
if we consider that if it was adopted it would be a matter of luck that we
have a language with a decent negation. Couldn’t it be that a language is as
the Tractatus claims it to be and lacks mutually exclusive sentences? Thus
even if it is granted that some languages may contain mutually exclusive
sentences, there are circumstances under which ⊥ need not be false, namely
if a language fails to have this property. Far from solving any problems
for Dummett and Prawitz, it should evoke Frege’s comments on Mill’s gin-
gerbread arithmetic: ‘wie gut doch, dass nicht Alles in der Welt niet- und
nagelfest ist’ (Frege 1990, 9); how convenient indeed that our language is
such that it contains the sentences it does in fact contain, as otherwise we
couldn’t do logic properly.
Rhetoric aside, one might of course try to advance arguments that for
some reason or other there must always be true as well as false sentences in
a language, or that a language could not be as Wittgenstein would have it
in the Tractatus, or at least that any language could always be extended in
30This was my initial reaction when I found the argument of section 4.2.1. (Tennant
1999) also proposes it in reply to (Hand 1999).
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such a way as to contain mutually exclusive sentences, or that the meanings
of sentences are propositions and there are true ones and false ones amongst
them. I have already mentioned that according to Dummett, using truth
and falsity both as primitive fails to meet his requirements. Quite generally,
the amendments just suggested cannot ensure that the meaning of negation
can be defined by rules of inference. They all leave proof-theory and rely
on assumptions external to it. One might object that if molecularity as
a principle motivated by the philosophy of language may enter the proof-
theoretic justification of deduction, then why not also let other theses shape
the theory, like the ones just mentioned, which maybe could also be argued
for in the philosophy of language? This question misses the point that
there is a crucial difference between molecularity and these further theses.
Molecularity is a principle that enters the form of the rules. Contrary to
that, these further theses affect their content. But the content was precisely
what was to be determined exclusively by the rules. Hence no matter how
well these theses might be established in the philosophy of language, making
them an essential part of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction has
the effect of letting the theory collapse.
Although the ‘amendments’ to Dummett’s theory mentioned in this sec-
tion may very well be interesting new approaches to defining the meaning
of negation, they are in fact not amendments at all, but incompatible with
Dummett’s approach.
4.3.2 Falsity and assertibility
Another attempt is to argue that the intended meaning of ⊥ is captured by
the rules governing it, as ⊥ is governed by an elimination rule only and no
introduction rule. So it has no grounds for its assertion. Hence there are no
conditions under which it may be correctly asserted, hence under which it
is true. So it can only be false.31
First, this a non sequitur and still does not guarantee that ⊥ is indeed
always false. Although being always false is a sufficient condition for some-
thing not to have grounds for its assertion, this is not necessary. That
something has no grounds that warrant its assertion does not entail that it
is false. It could be that we cannot assert it because we cannot put ourselves
in a position to assert all the premises it relies on. No one would claim that
the conclusion of the ω-rule is always false.
Secondly, the attempt is of no use in the present context. An intuitionist
could be perfectly happy with the claim that ex falso quodlibet determines
the meaning of ⊥ completely. On an intuitionist understanding of falsity, if
it can be proved that something has no warrant, then it is false, and nothing
is easier than showing that this holds for ⊥, as it has no introduction rule.
31Cf. (Prawitz 1979) and (Read 2000, 139).
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The problem is that this reasoning presupposes the anti-realist’s notion of
truth, explained in terms of assertibility. That something is unassertible
entails that it is false only given the anti-realist notion of truth. Hence if
this line of thought were used in the explanation of the meaning of falsum,
it would certainly not be true of intuitionist logic that ‘its logical constants
can be understood, and its logical laws acknowledged, without appeal to
any semantic theory and with only a very general meaning-theoretical back-
ground.’ (Dummett 1993, 300) An analogous way would obviously be open
to the classicist, using his preferred notion of truth. No explanation of the
meaning of ⊥ that satisfies the requirements of the proof-theoretic justifica-
tion of deduction in being semantically neutral is forthcoming.32
4.3.3 Empty succedents
Maybe the argument put forward to show that the meaning of negation is
not definable in Dummett’s way asks for the impossible, given the framework
he chose for formalising logic: if an arbitrary B is said to follow from ⊥,
fair enough, ⊥ might be true. But isn’t this shortcoming easily rectified if,
instead of B, we allow an empty space to occur?33 To explain validity in the
modified natural deduction framework, we adopt a suitable modification of
an explanation of the validity in sequent calculi, where multiple and empty
conclusions are allowed: a sequent Γ : ∆ is valid if, whenever all of Γ are
true, some of ∆ are true. Surely then, if from ⊥ only emptiness follows, it
must be false.
No doubt, this reasoning towards an always false ⊥ is unassailable. The
only problem with it is that it has the cart before the horse in the con-
text of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction. The explanation of the
validity of sequents is a semantic one: an inference is valid if it is truth-
preserving. On Dummett’s view of the matter, the proof-theoretic justifi-
cation of deduction must forswear the use of semantic notions in defining
validity and instead define it in proof-theoretic terms: harmonious rules are
32Appeal to warrants is not in itself biased towards intuitionism. Read describes himself
as giving an account of the meanings of the logical constants in terms of what warrants an
assertion of a complex formula with the constant as main connective (Read 2000, 130). He
proposes infinitary rules for the quantifiers (ibid., 136ff). If Read’s notion of a warrant was
an anti-realist one, it would follow that we can assert the negation of every universally
quantified sentence. The assumption that ∀xFx is assertible would entail a sentence
which is never assertible, namely that we have checked an infinite number of sentences
Fti , understood as an actual, completed infinity, for otherwise we could not proceed to
draw the conclusion. Analogously for existentially quantified formulas. Read’s notion
of a warrant needs to be understood in a realist sense: for some warrantedly assertible
sentences it is not within our powers to obtain those warrants. Read does not give a neutral
justification of classical logic, but a rather unsurprising one on the basis of a realist notion
of warrant, which is hard to distinguish from a realist notion of truth. Similar remarks
apply to Hacking, who also recommends infinitary quantifier rules (Hacking 1979, 313).
33As suggested in (Tennant 1999).
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self-justifying and valid purely by virtue of their form. That these rules are
truth-preserving is a consequence of harmoniousness. The explanation of
the validity of sequents does not fit with Dummett’s outlook and, indeed,
makes the proof-theoretic justification of deduction a rather idle pursuit.
Without it, there is again no guarantee that interpretations of the language
on which falsum is true are excluded, even if empty spaces are employed.
5 Conclusion
To sum up the dialectics of this paper, the argument against tertium non
datur was intended as an argument that appeals only to very general con-
siderations about the form a Dummettian theory of meaning has to take. It
assumes that there is a difference in semantic complexity between A∨¬A and
¬(A∨¬A). The classicist can respond by pointing out that this assumption
is unwarranted, as the same conceptual resources are required to understand
each of them. The argument against rules yielding classical negation is an
attempt to improve upon the situation by making a further assumption:
that there are negation-free sentences B the double negation of which is
true. Then the rules for classical negation licence uses of B not otherwise
licensed, which results in a circular dependence of meaning, contradicting
Dummett’s requirement of molecularity. This argument assumes that ¬B
is semantically more complex than B. A classicist can counter by arguing
that a sentence and its negation should count as being of the same semantic
complexity, as their understanding requires the same conceptual resources
on the part of the speaker. Adopting Geach’s view of negation, A and ¬A
occupy the same position in the partial ordering dependence of meaning
imposes on the expressions of a language in a molecular theory of meaning.
The Dummettian response is an attempt to establish that the negation of a
sentence is indeed semantically more complex than the sentence itself. The
argument is based on the proof-theoretic justification of deduction and aims
to achieve two things: first, ¬A needs to be defined as A ⊃ ⊥, which is
undeniably more complex than A, and secondly, only intuitionist but not
classical negation is governed by rules of inference satisfying the require-
ments imposed. The classicist response is to point out that the meaning of
⊥ cannot be defined by rules of inference in the Dummettian framework,
and hence the meaning of negation cannot so be defined either. Thus the
fact that the rules for classical negation do not fulfil the requirements of the
proof-theoretic justification of deduction does not warrant its rejection. I
conclude that Dummett has not formulated a fair objection to classical logic
on the basis of considerations about the form a theory of meaning has to
take.
The classicist responses to the Dummettian arguments do not challenge
the meaning-theoretical assumptions of Dummett’s programme, molecular-
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ity and the principle that meaning is use. They do not appeal to any as-
sumptions which are specifically classical, such as a realist notion of truth.
The responses prejudge no issues between classicists and intuitionists. No
charge of circularity can be put against them.
The strength of the classicist line of defence is also its weakness. Noth-
ing in the proposed answers to the Dummettian challenges suggests that
classical logic has to be preferred over intuitionist logic. An intuitionist
can accept all the assumptions made in the classicist responses. The Dum-
mettian programme, modified in the light of the fact that the meaning of
negation cannot be defined proof-theoretically by adopting negation as a
primitive notion along Geach’s lines, is logically rather more neutral than
Dummett had thought his original project to be: it is compatible with both
classical and intuitionist logic. I shall leave the question what conclusions
to draw from this for another occasion.
6 Appendix
I argued that Geach’s view on negation suggests itself as a supplement to the
proof-theoretic justification of deduction, so that negation is an additional
primitive on the same par as affirmation. There is a promising alternative
approach that shares the insight that positive as well as negative primitives
are needed. Huw Price has suggested that sense should be specified in
terms of two primitive speech acts, assertion and denial, where negation can
be defined in terms of them.34 The difference is important enough: Price
suggests to double pragmatic primitives, I suggest to double semantic ones.
I omitted bilateralism in the main part of this paper, as it is reasonably
far removed from Dummett’s original framework and deserves consideration
on its own rights. At the request of several readers, I add this appendix
to say a few words about Price’s and Rumfitt’s approach. I discuss them
in detail in two separate papers. To avoid giving away too much of their
content, I’ll restrict myself to summarising results established there. There
is, however, an independent point to this appendix, namely to indicate that
it is preferable to leave the ‘unilateral’ framework of proof-theoretic seman-
tics as it is and adopt the two primitives affirmation and negation rather
than change the framework to one in which the primitives are assertion and
denial. Even if we accept that negation is a primitive, that doesn’t mean we
can’t say anything interesting about it, so towards the end I also say a few
words about how I envisage an account of negation to proceed.
Most philosophers accept Frege’s view that there is no need to posit a
primitive force of denial (Frege 1918, 153). We cannot understand certain
34See (Price 1983), (Price 1990), (Price 2015). (Smiley 1996) and (Humberstone 2000)
follow up some of Price’s ideas. (Rumfitt 2000) calls the position bilateralism and provides
a formal development of a logic for assertion and denial.
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inferences, such as those where the minor premise is rejected and the major
premise is a conditional with a negated antecedent, in terms of a force of
denial, as a speech act cannot be embedded into a conditional. We need
negation as a sentential operator. But then denial is redundant, as we can
define it in terms of negation and assertion. Price’s and Rumfitt’s accounts
are more complicated than the unilateral account. It seems as if bilateralism
only succeeds in introducing needless complexities.
Bilateralism and unilateralism aren’t, however, equivalent theories, ac-
cording to Price and Rumfitt. They aim to meet a well-known Dummettian
challenge: to provide a framework for a theory of meaning that justifies
classical logic but does not suffer from the shortcomings Dummett claims
such an approach must face, by ensuring that it provides for a notion of
sense intelligible to the kind of speakers that we are. Even Dummett and
his most ardent followers, I think, agree that it would be preferable if clas-
sical logic were the justified one. Price and Rumfitt claim that bilateralism
succeeds in justifying classical logic, whereas unilateralism does not. If that
is correct, then the complexities of bilateralism are justified, as they result
in establishing a theoretical desideratum, namely the justification of classical
logic.
In two papers on bilateralism, one on Price and one on Rumfitt, I argue
that each approach fails to justify classical logic as the unique logic. Price’s
account, ironically, works better for intuitionist logic. In a similar vein, it is
possible to formulate an intuitionist bilateral logic in Rumfitt’s framework
in which the rules are harmonious, just as they are for classical logic. Thus
the complexities bilateralism introduces into the debate fail to serve their
purpose of justifying classical logic as the unique correct logic. This means
that the unilateral approach of the current paper is to be preferred over
their bilateral approach on methodological grounds.
In the paper on Price, I regiment Price’s account by formulating axioms
that capture the concepts Price employs in his argument that bilateralism
justifies classical logic. Price proposes a pragmatic account of belief in terms
of the differences they make to speakers’ actions. My formalisation shows a
certain amount of redundancy in the concepts Price employs. It turns out
that the axioms entail consequences about the notion of making a difference
that Price can’t accept: if classical logic is correct, the notion is either vac-
uous or highly problematic. As my axiomatisation follows Price’s wording
very closely, it cannot be argued that the result merely shows my axioma-
tisation to be wrong. I show how a very small modification—adding a ‘not’
at a place in an axiom characterising disbelief where one would expect one
anyway—insures that the notion of making a difference regains its interest.
The theory is then, however, best seen as intuitionist, and classical logic
cannot be established on the basis of it. My axiomatisation uses all the
resources Price provides, so to get classical logic, Price needs to extend his
account. This may of course be possible, and I consider Price’s options, but
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all this establishes is that both alternatives are possible, not what Price had
intended to show, namely that only the classical version is justified.
Rumfitt poses the intuitionist a challenge: to provide a bilateral account
of intuitionist logic in which the rules of the system are in harmony. Rumfitt
demands of the intuitionist a specification of what in general follows from
the denied negation of a formula that is harmonious with the introduction
rule for denied negations. Classicists and intuitionists agree that the denied
negation of a formula follows from its assertion. The harmonious elimination
rule, according to Rumfitt, is that the asserted formula follows from its
denied negation. This is only acceptable to the classicist, not the intuitionist.
I show how to formulate different rules that are also harmonious, but result
in an intuitionist bilateral logic. Thus Rumfitt’s challenge is met. This is
not the place to go into the formal details, but harmonious rules for an
intuitionist bilateral logic can be formulated by making a fuller use than
Rumfitt himself does of the possibilities offered by the formal framework of
bilateral logics.
As neither Price’s nor Rumfitt’s approach lends itself exclusively to the
classicist, but in each case an intuitionist alternative can be formulated,
for methodological reasons—that a simpler theory is to be preferred over
an equivalent more complex one—it follows that the unilateral approach
proposed in this paper comes out as superior to its bilateral rivals.
Rumfitt’s formalism also faces an independent problem of how to inter-
pret deductions carried out in it. In Rumfitt’s bilateral logic, the premises,
discharged assumptions and conclusions are supposed to be understood as
asserted or denied formulas. Rumfitt accepts that speech acts cannot be em-
bedded in other speech acts. Thus, the formulas in Rumfitt’s system cannot
be understood as being prefixed by ‘It is assertible that’ and ‘It is deniable
that’, as these are sentential operators and can be embedded. Rumfitt’s
bilateral formalism faces a fundamental conceptual problem: what does it
mean to assume an assertion or a denial in a deduction? Arguably, this
makes no sense, as it is plausible that making an assumption is a speech act.
Even if the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference
within proof-theoretic semantics, we can still give an account of it. This
is the aim of another paper of mine. For the purposes of this appendix,
an indication of the general idea should suffice. Just as the meaning of a
predicate, say ‘is red’, cannot be given purely by rules of inference, but the
colour red has to figure in how its meaning is determined, the meaning of
‘not’ has to be given by reference to something other than rules of inference.
Inferential relations may play an important role in determining the meaning
of an expression even if that meaning cannot be completely determined by
rules of inference. The predicate ‘is red’ gets its meaning from the inferential
relations is stands in with other colour terms and what it refers to, the
colour red. The structure colours exhibit together validates inferences such
as that what is red is not green. Negation enters the understanding of
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concepts that exhibit complex inferential structures, like the colour words,
and thus cannot be understood without a grasp of that structure. Certain
metaphysical consideration may enter the Geachean account, but that is
unsurprising: the relation between affirmation and negation is connected to
facts about the world. It is the point where metaphysics enters logic. If
the meaning of negation cannot be defined within proof-theoretic semantics,
this means that it loses the purity that Dummett envisaged it to have.
It is important, however, to stay as neutral as possible when it comes to
the question of whether classical or intuitionist negation is the correct one.
Another question to be addressed in my paper is whether, on the basis of
my Geachean account of negation, Dummett’s complaints about multiple
conclusion logics can be shown to be unfounded: this gives a smooth and
elegant route to justifying classical logic. The paper aims to show how,
building on Geach’s ideas, a viable account of negation can be given that
fills the gap in proof-theoretic semantics identified in the present paper, but
nonetheless stays true to its spirit.
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